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In this article we present a general security strategy for quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocols
based on the HBB scheme presented by Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume [Phys. Rev A 59, 1829
(1999)]. We focus on a generalization of the HBB protocol to n communication parties thus including
n-partite GHZ states. We show that the multipartite version of the HBB scheme is insecure in certain
settings and impractical when going to large n. To provide security for such QSS schemes in general
we use the framework presented by some of the authors [M. Huber, F. Minert, A. Gabriel, B. C.
Hiesmayr, Phys. Rev. Lett. 104, 210501 (2010)] to detect certain genuine n partite entanglement
between the communication parties. In particular, we present a simple inequality which tests the
security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In classical cryptography secret sharing has been in-
troduced by Shamir [1] and Blakley [2] in 1979 and is
useful in many applications. The main idea is to divide
a secret into several shares and distribute these shares
among several parties such that the secret can be recon-
structed when a certain number of parties (or all) come
together and combine their shares. Additionally, each
party alone is not able to gain any information about
the secret. The idea of secret sharing has been brought
to Quantum Cryptography in 1999 when Hillery, Buzˇek
and Berthiaume presented their scheme [3] based on GHZ
states. Since then Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) has
been another field of great interest besides Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD). In the same year Karlsson, Koashi
and Imoto also presented a similar QSS protocol based on
Bell states [4] and several other schemes followed [5–17].
Most of these protocols make heavy use of entangled
states to communicate between several parties. In gen-
eral, the security of such protocols is rather complex to
analyze since there are more parties involved compared to
QKD and some of the legal participants have to be con-
sidered dishonest. This model of adversaries from the in-
side is in fact much stronger because such an adversary in
general has more advantages than an eavesdropper from
the outside. The success of the protocol depends strongly
on the fact that all parties share a certain genuine mul-
tipartite entangled state after transmission. We show in
this paper that the security of a protocol can be obtained
by checking for this certain genuine multipartite entan-
glement. For that we use the framework presented in
Refs. [18, 19] which provide Bell-like inequalities which
are experimentally testable.
In the following section we shortly review the HBB
scheme including the argument presented in Ref. [20] re-
garding the security against a cheating Charlie. Further,
we discuss the generalization of the HBB scheme to n
qubits and present a successful eavesdropping strategy
based on the argument in Ref. [20]. Based on the in-
equalities we provide a new security argument for n qubit
secret sharing protocols.
II. THE HBB SCHEME
In their article [3] Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume pre-
sented a quantum secret sharing scheme based on the
distribution of GHZ states of the form
|Ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC (1)
between three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie. Each
party measures its qubit at random in one of two bases.
Based on their results, Bob and Charlie together are able
to determine Alice’s result but individually have no in-
formation about it.
In detail, Alice generates copies of the state |Ψ〉 in her
laboratory and sends qubit B to Bob and qubit C to
Charlie. Then, each party randomly chooses to measure
its qubit either in the X or in the Y basis. The eigen-
states of these bases are
|x±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) |y±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i|1〉). (2)
Taking the X basis the GHZ state |Ψ〉 can be written as
|Ψ〉ABC = 1
2
[(|x+〉A|x+〉B + |x−〉A|x−〉B)|x+〉C
+(|x+〉A|x−〉B + |x−〉A|x+〉B)|x−〉C ].
(3)
2Alice
Bob
|x+〉 |x−〉 |y+〉 |y−〉
|x+〉 |x+〉 |x−〉 |y+〉 |y−〉
|x−〉 |x−〉 |x+〉 |y−〉 |y+〉
|y+〉 |y−〉 |y+〉 |x−〉 |x+〉
|y−〉 |y+〉 |y−〉 |x+〉 |x−〉
TABLE I: Charlie’s state depending on Alice’s and Bob’s mea-
surement result.
From this fact it is easy to see that if both Alice and
Bob perform their measurements in the X basis and
obtain the same result, Charlie ends up with the state
|x+〉. Otherwise, if Alice and Bob obtain different re-
sults, Charlie ends up with the state |x−〉. Regarding
the case when Alice and Bob perform their measurement
both in the Y basis or in different bases similar conditions
can be found for Charlie’s state (c.f. table I).
After each party performed its measurement they all
announce their bases for the whole sequence sent by Al-
ice but do not reveal the specific result. Additionally,
all three parties sacrifice some of the remaining measure-
ment results to check for eavesdroppers and dishonest
parties by comparing them publicly. Based on the in-
formation about the basis choice of the remaining qubits
Charlie always knows whether Alice and Bob have the
same results or not, but he has no information about
their exact results. Further, Bob knows that he either
has the same or the opposite result of Alice and thus
needs the information about Charlie’s measurement re-
sult to fully determine it. Thus, Bob and Charlie have to
collaborate to obtain Alice’s result. Due to the random
choice of the measurement bases, Charlie will measure in
the wrong basis half of the times. These cases can be
identified when the three parties reveal their bases and
the respective qubits have to be discarded.
The security argument, as is described above, has been
presented in Ref. [3] but later that year Karlsson et al.
commented on the HBB scheme that the order in which
the measurement bases and the results for the test bits
are revealed is crucial [4]. They showed that the HBB
scheme becomes insecure if the measurement bases are re-
vealed before the results for the test bits. They suggested
the following sequence: first, Bob and Charlie publicly
disclose their measurement results for the test bits and
afterwards, in the reversed order, they announce the cor-
responding measurement bases. The reversed order is
important such that none of them can gain too much in-
formation from the actions of the previous parties. We
want to stress that this is, nevertheless, not a very effi-
cient way to secure the protocol since the order of the
messages is not implicitly preserved by the network. Al-
ice has to tell each party when to send its result and has
to wait on the response. In case of three parties as in the
HBB scheme there is no big difference but it can become
a large overhead when going to n parties.
III. A NEW SECURITY ARGUMENT
In three articles [18, 19, 21] the authors presented a
series of inequalities to test for genuine multipartite en-
tanglement and for k-separability for any multipartite
qudit system. These Bell-like inequalities are easily ex-
perimentally implementable as only local observables are
needed. We present here how two inequalities designed
for the HBB protocol described above can be used to
check for adversaries.
The idea is that the attack strategy based on auxil-
iary qubits as presented in Ref. [4] does not work if the
parties can verify that they share a genuinly multipartite
entangled n-qubit state. The intervention of an untrusted
party, e.g. Charlie, is based on the auxiliary qubits he
introduces into the protocol to gain additional informa-
tion about Bob’s results. Differently stated, it changes
the overall state and this can be detected by performing
certain additional setups and evaluating the inequalities
given in eq. (6) below.
Before we present the inequalities we need to define
bi-separability: If the density operator of a 3 qubit state
can be decomposed into the following form
ρbisep =∑
j
pjρ
j
AB ⊗ ρjC +
∑
j
qjρ
j
AC ⊗ ρjB +
∑
j
rjρ
j
BC ⊗ ρjA ,
(4)
with pj , qj , rj ≥ 0 and
∑
j pj + qj + rj = 1, it is called
biseparable. Here the two-body states ρjAB, ρ
j
BC and
ρjAC can describe entangled states. Even though there is
no bipartite splitting with respect to which the state ρ
is separable, it is considered biseparable since it can be
prepared through a statistical mixture of bipartite entan-
gled states. Generalization to n-qubit states is straight-
forward.
Based on the bi-separability we can define the inequal-
ities for the 3-qubit case of the HBB protocol. Using
σ1 := I and the abbreviation for the Pauli operators
〈σi ⊗ σj ⊗ σk〉ρ := ijk (5)
we can rewrite and linearize the inequalities derived in
Refs. [18, 19] in terms of local observables:
3I1 :
1
8
(xxx − yyx− yxy − xyy)− 1
16
(3 · 111− zz1− z1z − 1zz) ≤ 0
I2 :
1
8
(yyy − xxy − xyx− yxx)− 1
16
(3 · 111− zz1− z1z − 1zz) ≤ 0 . (6)
These inequalities are satisfied for all biseparable states.
It is convex, therefore it obviously valid for mixed states.
As it is easy to see the first inequality uses combina-
tions of local observables which are needed in the original
HBB scheme to form the secret key (cf. table I) whereas
the second inequality uses combinations which are dis-
carded in the original protocol (i.e. yyy, yxx, xyx and
xxy). Unfortunately, the latter one can only be applied
if the initial state is the ”imaginary” GHZ state
|Φ0〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ i|111〉). (7)
Thus, we have to adjust the original HBB protocol in
the following way: Alice prepares at random one of two
states, either the standard GHZ state |Ψ〉 or the state
|Φ〉. Then, she distributes the qubits between Bob and
Charlie as in the original protocol. Due to the use of the
inequalities in eq. (6) the Z-basis has to be introduced as
an additional measurement basis. After Bob and Charlie
performed their measurements they announce their bases
and Alice tells them to reveal some of their results to
test for the inequalities. Here, Alice tests with the first
inequality of eq. (6) whenever she prepared the state
|Ψ〉 and with the second inequality when she prepared
|Φ〉. We want to stress that Alice does not announce
which initial state she prepared until after the check for
eavesdroppers. Therefore, the sequence in which Bob
and Charlie announce their bases and results is irrelevant
since a cheating Charlie can not be sure whether Alice
initially prepared |Ψ〉 or |Φ〉. Hence, Charlie introduces
a certain error and will be detected by the legitimate
parties as it is explained in detail in the next section.
The application of the inequalities makes it possible
to overcome the check for the correct order of the mes-
sages and thus makes the protocol less complex. The
introduction of the second GHZ state |Φ〉 does not in-
fluence the efficiency, since combinations of observables
which are discarded in the original protocol can be used
with the state |Φ〉 and vice versa. The only drawback is
the additional measurement basis Z, which is not nec-
essary to establish the secret but is needed to compute
the inequalities. Fortunately, we can overcome also this
problem by choosing Z only with a certain probability q,
which can go to 0 in the asymptotic limit.
IV. SECURITY PROOF FOR 3 QUBITS
In particular the first inequality in eq. (6) is violated
by the GHZ-state |Ψ〉 in the computational basis with the
value 1
2
, which is the optimum for any GHZ-state repre-
sentation. Note that there are several representations of
the GHZ-state which would give no violation.
The security check – optimized for the basis system the
three parties agreed on – would therefore use some of the
measurement results to evaluate the inequalities (similar
to the check for adversaries suggested in [3]). Addition-
ally, the three parties also have to perform measurements
in the Z basis to evaluate the inequalities, which slightly
changes the protocol, as pointed out above. If the in-
equalities are violated, the parties can be sure that no
adversary is present, what we prove in the following.
In Ref. [20] it has been shown – using a more gen-
eral approach than in [4] – that the original HBB scheme
[3] is insecure against a dishonest Charlie. The main
idea is again that Charlie intercepts the qubit flying to
Bob and entangles it with an ancillary qubit. Later
on, he uses his qubit together with the ancillary qubit
to infer Alice’s measurement result without Bob’s assis-
tance. In detail, Charlie uses an ancillary qubit in the
state |0〉E and entangles it with the intercepted qubit
B using the Hadamard operation H = 1/
√
2(|0〉〈0| +
|0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|) on qubit B and a CNOT opera-
tion CNOT = |0〉〈0| ⊗ I+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ σx on qubits B and E.
This brings the initial system |Ψ0〉ABC ⊗ |0〉E into the
states
|Ψ1〉 = 1
2
(|0000〉+ |0101〉+ |1010〉 − |1111〉)ABCE . (8)
Charlie sends qubit B to Bob and waits until Alice and
Bob announce their measurement bases. According to
the measurement results of Alice and Bob, the qubits C
and E in Charlie’s possession collapse into some prede-
fined state. In case both Alice and Bob measure in the
X basis Charlie obtains one of the states
|Ψx+x+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉)CE
|Ψx+x−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉)CE
|Ψx−x+〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉 − |10〉+ |11〉)CE
|Ψx−x−〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉 − |11〉)CE .
(9)
Charlie uses this fact together with the information about
Bob’s measurement basis and result to determine the cor-
rect value he has to announce to stay undetected. Fur-
ther, Charlie is also able to compute Alice’s result with-
out any help of Bob [20], which makes the whole protocol
insecure.
4Taking our suggested modified version of the HBB
scheme performing the check for adversaries based on
the inequalities and employing 2 GHZ states at random
Charlie is always detected with a certain probability. As
pointed out, Charlie’s attack mainly relies on the infor-
mation about Bob’s bases and results, which he can also
obtain in our modified version. Nevertheless, Charlie is
unable to decide which initial state Alice prepared such
that he can only guess the correct result to violate the
inequalities.
In detail after Charlie’s attack the four qubit state is
a mixture of the two following states are mixed
|Ψ1〉 = 1
2
(|0000〉+ |0101〉+ |1010〉 − |1111〉)ABCE
|Φ2〉 = 1
2
(|0000〉+ |0101〉+ i|1010〉 − i|1111〉)ABCE .
(10)
Ignoring Charlies additional qubit the first inequality de-
rives to I1 : − 12 −p ≤ 0 and the second inequality derives
to I2 :
1
2
− p ≤ 0 with p being the probability that Al-
ice chooses the state |Ψ1〉. These values are different to
the expected values without cheating parties, thus Char-
lie will be revealed. On the other hand Charlie can try
to act by local unitaries on qubit C or by unitaries on
qubits CE (here we used the convenient parametrization
of the unitary group U(4) in Ref. [22]) such that the value
of I1 gets more positive but the trade off is that I2 gets
more negative, again this can be detected. In summary,
the suggested attack to the HBB scheme presented in
Ref. [20] as well as any generalization of it is detected by
the test of the two inequalities.
V. SECURITY PROOF FOR n QUBITS
The inequalities provided by the framework presented
in Refs. [18, 19] can be extended to any number of qubits.
To give an example, for the 4-qubit case described in the
previous section we get a similar inequalities:
1
8
(xxxx − yyxx− yxyx− xyyx− xxyy − xyxy − yxxy + yyyy) −
1
16
(7 · 1111− zz11− z11z − 11zz − z1z1− 1z1z − 1zz1− zzzz) ≤ 0 and
1
8
(xxxy + xxyx+ xyxx + yxxx− xyyy − yxyy − yyxy − yyyx) −
1
16
(7 · 1111− zz11− z11z − 11zz − z1z1− 1z1z − 1zz1− zzzz) ≤ 0 (11)
Also in this case, the four communicating parties sacrifice
some of their measurement results to test the inequali-
ties. If they are satisfied they have to assume that an
adversary is present. Extending the attack strategy from
[13] to four parties the state Charlie uses in his attack is
a 6-qubit entangled state. Due to his intervention, the
genuine 4-qubit state is destroyed and thus no genuine
4-qubit entanglement can be detected using the inequal-
ities. Hence, the legitimate communication parties dis-
cover Charlie’s intervention and abort the protocol.
The inequalities for n qubits can be derived straight
forward from the 3-qubit case (eq. 6) and the 4-qubit
case (eq. 11). Thus, the check for adversaries can be
performed in the same way as described above. This gives
the advantage that the communication parties no longer
have to rely on the order of the messages. The adversary,
Charlie, does not know which of the measurement results
count for the test of the inequalities and which count for
the secret. Hence, he sends measurement results which
do not violate the inequalities and therefore he is detected
by the other parties also in the most general case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article we presented a security argument for
general HBB-type quantum secret sharing schemes be-
tween n parties. The check for adversaries of such pro-
tocols is in general getting more and more inefficient if a
large number of parties is involved. We present a differ-
ent security strategy based on the verification of genuine
multipartite entanglement itself which is at the heart of
such protocols and in addition that is efficient also for
large number of parties.
In a slightly different version of the HBB protocol
we described a way to integrate this security check effi-
ciently, i.e. by simple Bell–like inequalities (Refs. [18, 19])
adapted to the protocol. They use the data which is usu-
ally not regarded for the protocol and a measurement in
a third direction has to be introduced.
A test of these inequalities is a much stronger state-
ment than the common test for eavesdroppers presented
e.g. in Refs [3, 4] as they indicate the presence of an
adversary because any adversary has to change the n-
partite entangled state in order to obtain any information
5on the secrete.
Certainly, our presented general scheme may be ap-
plied to secret sharing protocols involving multi-qudit
systems or graph states.
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